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iii.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure. See also Utah Code Ann, 78-2a-3(2)(e), conferring
jurisdiction on this Court.
The Judgment and Order of Probation were signed by the Honorable Lyle
Anderson on January 7th, 2003 and entered by the Clerk of the Court on January
7 , 2003. Sentencing was on January 6 , 2003. The Notice of Appeal was filed
on January 22nd, 2003, within 30 days of the entry of judgment. The Appeal is
therefore timely pursuant to Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The issues presented for appeal are as follows:
I.

Was the search of Defendant's vehicle legal?

II.

Should statements made by the Defendant to Law Enforcement
officers be suppressed as violative of his Miranda right?

Standard of Review: the Court reviews the factual findings underlying the
trial courts decision to grant or deny a Motion to Suppress under a clearly
erroneous standard. State v. Troyer, 910 P. 2d 1182, 1185 (Utah 1995).
The legal determination regarding reasonable suspicion made by the trial
courts are reviewed for correctness according no deference to the trial

1

court's conclusion. State v. Yates, 918 P. 2d 136, 138 (Utah 1996); State v.
Patefield, 927, P. 2d 655 (Utah App. 1996).

TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Article I, Section 14, of the Constitution of Utah provides, in relevant part,
that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause
supported by oath or affirmation describing the place to be searched,
and the person or thing be seized.

Amendment Four of the Constitution of the United States provides, in
relevant part, that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things be seized.

Amendment Five of the Constitution of the United States provides, in
relevant part, that:
No person...shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law.
Amendment Six of the Constitution of the United States provides, in
relevant part, that:
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In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law, and to informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of counsel for his
defense.
Amendment Fourteen of the Constitution of the United States provides, in
relevant part, that:
No State shall...deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of law.
Utah Code Section 76-l-501(l)(2)(a)(b) provides, in relevant part, that:
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be innocent
until each element of the offense charged against him is proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. In absence of such proof, the
defendant shall be acquitted.
(2) As used in this part the words "element of the offense" mean:
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or results of
conduct proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden in the
definition of the offense;
(b) The culpable mental state required.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. NATURE OF THE CASE.
Mr. Bartlett appeals his conviction following a jury trial of Possession or
Use of a Controlled Substance, in violation of Section 58-37-8-(2)(a)(i) U.C.A., a
Third Degree Felony; Driving on a Suspended or Revoked Operator's License, in
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violation of Section 55-3-227 (i) a Class C Misdemeanor; and No Registration, in
violation of Section 41-la-1303(l) a Class C Misdemeanor.
Defendant does not allege any irregularities at his trial but appeals the
denial of his Motion to Suppress.

B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS,

Mr. Bartlett was charged in a three count Information filed on October 31 st ,
2002. After a Preliminary Hearing on Defendant was bound over on all charges.
Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress on December 4th, 2002.

The

Suppression Hearing was held on December 16th before the Honorable Lyle R.
Anderson, Judge. The Motion was denied.
After a Jury Trial on December 22nd, 2002, Defendant was found guilty of
all charges. Defendant was sentenced on January 6th, 2003.

C. DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW,

At sentencing Judge Anderson ordered the Defendant to serve a term in the
Utah State Prison not to exceed five years on Count I, and ninety days in the San
Juan County Jail on Counts 2 and 3. All time to be served concurrently. No fines
or restitution were ordered.

4

D,

STATEMENT OF FACTS.

On October 25, 2002 the Defendant James Bartlett was approaching the
City of Monticello Utah from the east (Suppression Hearing ["S.H."]-7) Kent
Rowley, a Monticello City Police Officer received a call from Dispatch advising a
green Cadillac was driving fast and recklessly (S.H.-7). He proceeded to the Port
of Entry to set up for radar (S.H.-8). He locked in Mr. Bartlett's vehicle going 72
miles an hour (S.H.-9). The vehicle was a Buick, not a Cadillac (S.H.-9). Officer
Rowley made traffic stop (S.H.-9).
The officer approached the vehicle and asked the driver, Mr. Bartlett for his
driver's license (S.H.-9, 10).

There were five other people in the car. Mr.

Bartlett's mother was in the front passenger seat, and a Mr. Snow and three
children in the back seat (S.H.-10; 13). Mr. Bartlett did not produce a driver's
license giving Officer Rowley an I.D. card (S.H.-10), and an expired registration
for the vehicle (S.H.-l 1). Mr. Bartlett also produced a title for the vehicle that had
been signed over to him. The original owners name in the title was a third party,
different from the name on the registration and from Mr. Bartlett (S.H.-l 1).
Officer Rowley took the information he had and contacted dispatch for a
"27," a Utah Drivers License Check. He also requested a warrant search. After
two or three minutes Officer Rowley was advised Mr. Bartlett's Utah Drivers
License was suspended and he had a warrant out of Vernal (S.H.-l 1, 12). He
advised Mr. Bartlett he was under arrest but is unsure whether he handcuffed him
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at that time (S.H.-12). Rowley asked the adult passengers to pull out their pockets
so he could check for weapons (S.H.-13). Mr. Snow produced a "brass bowl" with
marijuana residue in it (S.H.-13). He advised Mr. Snow he was under arrest as
well(S.H.-13).
Officer Rowley testified at that time he took both Mr. Bartlett and Mr.
Snow back to his vehicle and advised them of their Miranda Rights by reading
from a card taken from his wallet (S.H.-14). He believed they both indicated they
understood their rights and agreed to talk with him (S.H.-14). Officer Rowley
testified that at this point he asked Mr. Bartlett for a consent to search the vehicle
and that Mr. Bartlett said it was okay (S.H.-14). However, on cross-examination
Officer Rowley admitted that rather than ask for consent he had told Mr. Bartlett
that he was going to search the vehicle.
Deputy Monte Dalton with the San Juan County Sheriffs Office arrived at
the scene to assist Officer Rowley sometime between the stop and the search of
the vehicle (S.H.-15; 43). Although the initial stop was at 2:00 p.m. (S.H.-9) and
Dalton arrived at 2:05 p.m. (S.H.-44), Dalton testified Mr. Bartlett and Mr. Snow
were not arrested until 3:00 p.m. (S.H.-46). He referenced his notes to verify the
time (S.H.-45).
During the search Officer Rowley found a little plastic container with some
white residue. At that time he found the container Deputy Dalton approached him
and told him that Mr. Bartlett had told him there were some cross tops under the
front seat (S.H.-16). Cross Tops are a legal stimulant commonly sold in truck
6

stops (S.H.-36). Rowley never found any Cross Tops (S.H.-16). The white
residue field-tested positive for methamphetamine (S.H.-17).
Officer Dalton testified on examination as to what statements Mr. Bartlett
made purportedly after waiving his Miranda Rights. Mr. Bartlett told him he had
crushed Cross Tops, that he had purchased them, and crushed them to drink in his
coffee to stay awake (S.H.-18,19).
On cross examination Officer Rowley conceded his testimony as to when
Mr. Bartlett was read Miranda differed from his police report. The written report
indicated Mr. Bartlett was arrested and read his rights prior to the passengers being
searched (S.H.-22, 24). Officer Rowley acknowledged Mr. Bartlett did not arrive
at the jail until possibly 3:30 p.m. (S.H.-28).
Deputy Dalton testified as to how it came about that Mr. Bartlett made
statements about the cross tops. After Mr. Bartlett was arrested and was being
controlled by Deputy Dalton he "asked" what was going to be found (S.H.-49).
Deputy Dalton continued questioning, getting Bartlett to admit the plastic
container was his and eliciting information about a big bottle in the trunk (S.H.50). Mr. Bartlett also told him about mixing the cross tops in his coffee (S.H.-51).
On cross examination Deputy Dalton confirmed from his notes that
Miranda was given some 45-50 minutes after he arrived and that Rowley did not
get consent to search the vehicle (S.H.-55, 56).
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Mr. Bartlett testified that he did not give consent to search the vehicle and
the he was never advised of his Miranda Rights. Any statements he made were
after he was confronted and arrested (S.H.-64-5).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The trial court erred in denying Mr. Bartlett's Motion to Suppress. The
Officer exceeded the scope of the traffic violation. Although Mr. Bartlett may
have been taken into custody the vehicle could have been released to a passenger,
his mother, without a search.
Any statements made by Mr. Bartlett should be suppressed either because
he was not advised of his Miranda rights or if he did waive it was in the course of
an illegal seizure and his consent is void.

ARGUMENT
Point I: The Officer unlawfully exceeded the scope of the stop.

The burden is on the State of Utah to justify the stop and subsequent search.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the "Right of
the people to be secure in there persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures." The Utah Supreme Court has held that while
a person had a lesser expectation of privacy in his or her vehicle, one does not lose
the protection of the Fourth Amendment while in an automobile. State v. Lopez,
873 P. 2d 1127, 1131 (Utah 1994). The State is prohibited from conducting
8

unreasonable searched and seizures during a routine traffic stop. Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); See also Lopez, supra. Although Bartlett does
not take issue with the initial stop, conceding the officer's actions were reasonably
justified he does contend that, "The resulting detention was [not] reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first
place." Lopez, AT 1131-32, quoting Terry v. Ohio, 312 U.S. 1, (1968); bracketed
material added.
Although the traffic stop was valid, the courts have held that when an
officer stops a vehicle, "The detention must be temporary and last no longer that is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." The test for whether a search of
seizure is constitutionally plausible is twofold: (1) Was the officer's actions
justified at its inception? And (2) Was the resulting detention reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place? See
State v. Shepard, 955 P. 2d 352, 355 (Utah App 1998).
Once a traffic stop is made, the detention "must be temporary and
last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the
stop." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 103 S.
Ct. 1319 (1983). Both the "length and [the] scope of the detention
must be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which
rendered its initiation permissible." State v. Johnson, 805 P. 2d 761,
763 (Utah 1991)(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20). This means that
an officer conducting a routine traffic stop may request a driver's
license and vehicle registration, conduct a computer check, and issue
a citation. However, once the driver has produces a valid drivers
license and evidence of entitlement to use the vehicle, "he must be
allowed to proceed on his way, without being subjected to further
delay by police for additional questioning." State v. Robinson, 797
P. 2d 431, 435 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)(quoting United States v.
Guzman, 864 F. 2d 1512, 1519 (10th Cir. 1988). Investigative
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questioning that further detains the driver must be supported by
reasonable suspicion of the more serious criminal activity.
Reasonable suspicion means suspicion based on specific, articulable
facts drawn from the totality of the circumstances facing the officer
at the time of the stop. See State v. Mendoza, 748 P. 2d 181, 183
(Utah 1987); State v. Munsen, 821 P. 2d 13, 15 (Utah Ct. App.
1991); Robinson, 797 P. 2d at 435. If reasonable suspicion of more
serious criminal activity does arise, the scope of the stop is still
limited.
The officers must "diligently [pursue] a means of
investigation that [is] likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions
quickly, during which time it [is] necessary to detain the defendant."
State v. Grovier, 808 P. 2d 133, (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (quoting
United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 84 L. Ed. 2d 605, 105 S.
CT. 1568(1985)).
Lopez, Supra at 1132.
Mr. Bartlett's argument of what went unconstitutionally wrong in his case
is exactly that -that the detention lasted longer than necessary for the purpose of
the stop. Mr. Bartlett was stopped on a very minor traffic violation-speeding.
While he did not have a driver's license he did produce paperwork showing
entitlement to the vehicle. Once the office found the outstanding warrant, he was
required to arrest the Defendant, issue a citation, or release him.

State v.

Chapman, 921 P 2d 446.
The facts in the Shepherd case, cited above, are similar to this. In Shepherd
the Defendants were pulled over for speeding. They could not produce a valid
registration and there were questions about ownership while the comparing the
vehicle identification number on a card produced by the Defendants the officer
saw a marijuana pipe in plain view. The court found that the officer's conduct was
supported by an objectively reasonable suspicion. Although the State may argue

10

the similarities, there are two important distinctions. 1. There was nothing in plain
view in Bartlett's car.

Contraband was not discovered until a search was

conducted. 2. There was no need to search Bartlett's vehicle since it could have
been released to his mother.
The State may not argue that the search was justified by the consent of Mr.
Bartlett. The burden of establishing that a warrantless search is lawful is on the
State. State v. Larocco, 794 P 2d 460. To show that consent was lawfully
obtained the State must show it was (1) voluntary, and (2) not obtained by
explorations of prior eligibility.
"[A] defendant's consent to a search following illegal police activity
is valid under the Fourth Amendment only if both of the following
tests are met: (i) The consent was given voluntarily, and (ii) the
consent was not obtained by police exploitation of the prior
illegality." State v. Thurman, 846 P. 2d 1256, 1262 (Utah 1993); see
also State v. Arroyo, 796 P. 2d 684, 688 (Utah 1990). "It is the
State's burden to prove that a consent was voluntarily given... If the
State fails to meet this burden, the evidence is deemed inadmissible
against the defendant." Ham, 910 P. 2d at 439; accord Thurman,
846 P. 2d at 1263; State v. Robinson, 797 P. 2d 431, 437 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990). This court has adopted the following analytical
framework to determine whether the State has met its burden of
proving that consent was voluntarily given:
(1) There must be clear and positive testimony that the
consent was "unequivocal and specific" and "freely and intelligently
given";(2) the government must prove consent was given without
duress or coercion, express or implied; and (3) [when evaluating
these first two standards, we] indulge every reasonable presumption
against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and there
must be convincing evidence that such rights were waived.' Ham,
910 P. 2d at 439 (citations omitted)(alterations in original). In
determining whether consent was voluntarily given we will look to
the "totality of all circumstances." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 227, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2048, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973); accord
Ham, P. 2d at 439.
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State v. Hansen, 17 P. 3d 1135 (UT App. 2000)

It appears that the better position is that the issue of consent is moot.
Officer Rowley recanted his testimony that Mr. Bartlett gave consent, conceding
that he had informed Mr. Bartlett he was going to search the vehicle. Deputy
Dalton also testified the search was nonconsensual. However, even if the court
chooses to analyze the consent issue, it must ultimately be held that any consent
given was the result of an illegal detention and void. See State v. Arrayo, 796 P
2d 684 (1990), and State v. Robinson, 797 P 2d 431 (Utah App 1990).
In Robinson, the court determined, on facts similar to the present case, that
once the purposes of the initial stop had been accomplished, further detention of
the Defendant's was violative of their Fourth Amendment rights, Supra, at 437.
Because they were held after a brief detention the court held their consent was not
voluntarily and suppressed the results of the reach. In Mr. Bartlett's case evidence
is that the detention was lengthy, not brief.
The Fourth Amendment requires not only the exclusions of all evidence
directly obtained through its violation but also the exclusions of all "fruits"
thereof, Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963). Therefore any
statements made by Defendants must be suppressed.
Again, Defendant urges this argument is moot. He denies being advised of
his Miranda rights or waiving the same. However, even viewed in the lights most
favorable to the State, he was not advised of Miranda until 50 minutes after Dalton
12

arrived.

Clearly any statements Defendants made were in a custodial

interrogations setting after a lengthy illegal detention. They were used against him
extensively at trial. (Trial Transcript 70, 74, 75, 95).
They should be suppressed.
CONCLUSION
The original purpose of the traffic stop was quickly resolved. Mr. Bartlett
could have been arrested or released without further questioning or a search of his
vehicle. Because Mr. Bartlett was unlawfully detained the search of vehicle,
whether based on "consent" or not is invalid. Any statements he made should be
suppressed for failure to obtain a waiver of Miranda rights or because such waiver
was obtained through illegal exploitations.
This court should reverse the trial courts denial of the Motion to Suppress.

DATED this 13th day of May 2003.

*UL.
L/£
WILLIAM L. SCHWTZ
Attorney for Appellar
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I mailed true and correct copies of the foregoing
Opening Brief of Appellant to Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney General, 160 E. 300
South, Heber Wells Bldg., Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, postage prepaid, this 15th
day of May 2003.

L/JU^
William L. Schultz
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ADDENDUM

Copy of January 7,2003, Judgment and Order of Commitment to Utah State Prison.

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
San Juan County

<^o

JAN 0 7 2003
CLERK OF THE COURT
DEPUTY

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
JUDGEMENT AND ORDER
OF COMMITMENT TO
UTAH STATE PRISON

Plaintiff,
vs.
JAMES EARL BARTLETT

Case N o . 0217-94

Defendant.
JANUARY 6, 2003
HONORABLE LYLE R. ANDERSON
Plaintiff Attorney:

Craig C. Halls

Defendant Attorney:

William L. Schultz

DEFENDANT, JAMES EARL BARTLETT, having been found guilty of
the offenses of:
Count 1: POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, a Third
Degree Felony; Count 2: DRIVING ON SUSPENDED OR REVOKED
OPERATOR'S LICENSE, a Class C Misdemeanor; and Count 3: NO
REGISTRATION, a Class C Misdemeanor, and no legal reason having
been shown why judgment of this Court should not be pronounced,
it is the judgment of this Court as follows:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant is forthwith
remanded to the custody of the San Juan County Sheriff or other

proper officer for transportation to the Utah State Prison and
execution to the eentanc* given herein.
Defendant is npw sentenced to a term in the Utah State
Prison not to exceed FIVS YEARS on Count 1, 90 DAYS in the San
Juan County Jail on each Count 2 and 3, to be served
concurrently-

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the %^ day of January, 2 003, I
Trailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
JUDGEMENT A H D OOTBR OF COMMITWKNT to William L. Schultz, Attorney
for the d«£*x*d*nt at PO Sox 93 7, Mccto, UT 04532, Adult Probation
and Parole, 1165 South Hiqhway 191 #3, Moab, UT 84532; and to the
Department of Corrections, p,o. Box 250, Draper, UT 84020.

